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Abstract 
Label Switching Routers (LSR), such as IP switching 
of Ipsilon, use separate Virtual Circuits (VC)from 
diferent sources even having the same destination. 
Merging switches, on the other hand, allow multiple 
VCs of upstream traffic to use a single output VC if 
having same destination criteria. In this paper, we 
study IP switching of Ipsilon and identi& certain 
security threats. We found that oscillation between 
routing and switching as a result of a malicious 
frequent suspension and releasing ofjlows is a main 
security threat that decreases performance of such 
systems. To stabilize the performance in face of such 
an attack, we propose to utilize merging switches to 
mitigate the implications of oscillation in LSR. The 
simulation results enhances this claim. 
1. Introduction 
Increasingly, the Internet is growing in size and 
traflk, and is stimulating new designs of 
intemetworking architecture. Some examples of 
switch routers that have recently appeared as a result 
of this trend are the IP switching by Ipsilon 131. the 
cell switching by Toshiba, the ARIS [5] by E M ,  the 
SITA [2] by Finland Telecom, and the tag switching 
by Cisco. Sometimes this technology is referred to as 
Multi-protocol Label Switching. This technology is 
based on a number of criteria's that forms a special 
mechanism for establishing and terminating data 
transmissions. The first criteria is that, packetsare 
switched in the hardware level after being routed for a 
time through software level. This establishes a Virtual 
Circuit through which the data is transmitted by the 
hardware speed. Second criteria is that, the connection 
is teared down when the switch does not notice data 
transmission for a specific period of time. Third 
criteria is that cells of a fragmented packet are 
accumulated in a buffer till a cell with an indication of 
end of packet arrives where the packet as a whole can 
be forwarded to the specific VC. The loss or the 
tamper of this cell has illusive indication for stream 
continuation. These unique proprietary mechanism of 
IP switch namely: cut through, tear down and End of 
Packet indication are a potential security flawsfor 
such a system that could be a source for a number of 
scenarios for denial of service attack. The other 
objective of this paper that we try to address is. it is 
possible to solve 'certain security problems using 
different approaches other than the tradtional ones. 
For example, we proposed to use a new sort of 
switches that have the capability of merging virtual 
connections to alleviate the impact of denial of service 
on the non-merge switches that are used in the label 
switch routers. 
This paper is organized as follows. First, in section 2 
we give general description and necessary background 
for label switching technology and proposed solution. 
Then we focus on the oscillation problem as a main 
security threat in Ip switching, while in section 4 we 
propose a remedy for such a threat. 
2. Label Switching Illustrated 
Internet Protocol (P) suite provides the foundation 
for the current data communication infrastructure. IP 
protocols have proven to be very flexible due to their 
connectionless nature and have been deployed 
widely over the past two decades. Additionally, they 
dominate current network technology. 
Asynchronous Transfer mode (ATM). on the other 
hand can provide integrated services of media types 
and different bits rates. It offers unprecedented 
scalability and cost performance as well as the ability 
to reserve network resources for real-time oriented 
t r a c  and support for multi-point communication. 
Both network technologies, IP and ATM, have their 
strengths and weaknesses. For instance, one 
limitation of ATA4 networks has been the relatively 
large gap between the speed of the network data 
paths and that of control operations needed to 
configure those data paths to meet changing users' 
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needs. IP’s greatest strength- on the other han4 is its 
inherent flexibility and its capacity to adapt rapidly 
to changmg conditions. These complementary 
strengths and limitations make it natwal to combine 
IF’ with ATM to form a natural alliance that 
combines the best aspects of both technologies. 
The marriage of both technologies promises to 
deliver a robust network technology. Label 
Switching is the general term for this technology. It 
is based on the integration of layer 2 (Data link 
layer) and layer 3 (Network layer ) datagram labels 
to provide a high speed cut through mechanism for 
layer 3. ( i.e. shift routing to layer 2 with higher 
speed) see Figure 1. In Label Switching , rather than 
examining and analyzing each header at each router, 
the router will examine the label assigned to the 
packet at hardware level, thereby accelerating the 
forwarding process. 
Merging Flows in LSR 
Consider a VC that has already been established to a 
certain destination with certain QoS parameters. 
Then if another flow with the same destination and 
specification raised from an ingress having the same 
destination label. even from a different source, then 
it is possible to merge the flows at the switch to form 
a joint egress stream. The idea is in caching the VC 
in switch memory so that the next cells appearance 






does not have to be routed (atlayer3). InCached 
Switched Virtual Circuits, circuit time-outis 20 
seconds. Virtual circuits that are idle for longer than 
this amount of time are cached for future re-use. 
After 300 seconds (5 minutes) for example, of idle 
time, they are tom down [9]. If a switch has already 
established a VC for a flow to the same destination 
then the merge switch may use this VC to direct the 
flow. Provided an optimal, fair and efficient 
scheduling algorithm is used in merging, VC switch 
merging in general reduces call setup time for 
establishmg a VC in a switch and hence saves switch 
resources 
Thls approach is useful because it (1) reduces the 
label space at each switch, (2) saves setup time to 
establish a VC ( 3 )  reduces the number of VC’s and 
(4) reduces the pricing cost for call setup of a virtual 
circuit. 
Widjaja et al. in [l] described the specificationof 
implementing VC mergmg in switch from two 
directions: the hardware and the performance 
implication. They concluded that the overhead of VC 
merging in terms of the additional buffer requirement 
is minimal contrary to the widespread belief. The 
results claimed that the overhead decreases as 
utilization increases. or as the W i c  becomes more 
burst. Based on simulation results, the study 
encourages deploying such switches. provided a fair, 
optimal and efficient scheduhg algorithm is used. 





Layer 3 routing Layer 2 switching 
Figure 1. ( depicted from [ 11) 
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3. Security Threats on label Switching 
Networks 
We will consider IP Switching of Ipsilon as case 
study of a MPLS network, and as the best ofour 
knowledge, there is no relative work similar to this 
case study. As mentioned before that IP switchmg 
employs a special mechanism for establishing a 
connection and forwarding IP packets as well as 
adopting a special mechanism for cutting through and 
tearing down a connection. Due to the space 
limitation we will focus in partxular on the cut- 
through mechanism and study its security 
implications. 
Oscillation 
The decision to flip from routing to switching, 
i.e.“cut-through” , so the data will no longer be 
routed, is a crucial one and depends on the classifier 
mechanism adopted in the switch. see Figure 1 (b). 
The cut-through occurs when the LSR encounters a 
long flow and decides after N number of packets to 
switch the traffic at layer 2 after being routed at layer 
3. On the other hand, the flow “tears-down” if it 
encounters a gap or delay of packet arrival after a T 
amount of time. We define the phenomena of 
frequent flipping from routing to switchmg and from 
snitching to routing as Oscillation. Oscillation may 
be caused by malicious suspending (blocking) of 
datagrams flowing. For example, consider a long 
lasting application such as http file that is forwarded 
through an IP switch of X/Y classifier. The switch 
may decide after forwarding N packets to cut- 
through. Suppose an attacker, is siting between an IP 
host and a switch , acting as a gate, and deliberately 
blocking the flow through the switch for a time T 
equals to time set in the switch that is required to tear 
down a VC connection. This action causes the VC to 
tear down whle the actual application flow has not 
yet been terminated. The suspended flow will be 
released later and the LSR will start routing it again 
for a given number of packets N, and decides to cut- 
through, the flow will then be suspended for a T  
time, the VC will tear-down and so forth. This 
phenomena has severe implications on the 
performance of the IP switch especially onthose 
switches with a short timeout tear-down period and 
small number of packets to cut through. It causes 
“Oscillation” between routing and switching. 
The other source of oscillation is TP Header 
Tampering. Port classifiers and protocol classifiers 
depend on the port number and UDP or TCP 
information in deciding whether to establish a VC. 
Tampering port numbers, from example, from 80 to 
25, results changing flow nature from a long lasting 
flow (http) to a short lasting flow (smtp). This results 
routing a long lasting flow (layer 3) rather than 
switching it( layer 2). The switches that have a direct 
link to an IP sources (host or router) are most likely to 
face this attack, because these switches are the ones 
that take the decision to switch cells and to send 
lFMP cut-through messages to the next switch. 
4. Proposed Security Scheme 
To handle oscillation caused by blocking or 
suspending flows, we e‘xploit the merging criteria of 
the merge switch and enhance security by reducing 
the implication of such an attack. The readermay 
noticed that we have used the word ‘reduce‘ rather 
than ‘eliminate’, because the proposed scheme does 
not address to solve the problem. Rather, we attempt 
to ‘alleviate’ the implications of such an attack by 
using merge switches in the LSR. The basic idea is 
that when a new flow enters a switch and it happen 
that a previous flow had already established aVC 
with the same flow specification and destination, then 
the IP switch does not have to route the packet, but 
rather switch them directly to the same VC at layer 2. 
By ths way, the oscillation attack is better handled in 
contrast to non-merge switches. 
To study the implication of oscillation problem on the 
performance of both merge switch and non-merge 
switches, we ran a simulation program and set a 
comparison. We fixed the forwarding processing time 
for both type of switches based on assumption that 
both have relatively similar processing time [ 11. We 
created dfferent stream flows (data, audio and video) 
on both switches and mimicked the scenariointhe 
previous section. Both flows of the different sources 
are destined to the same destination. We assume that 
one of the flows is subject to denial of service by an 
attacker who blocks the flow on frequent basis equals 
the time needed to tear down an established VC and 
release the flow after the connection is teared down. 
The goal is to study the performance of the switches 
in such sort of attacks as described in section 3. 
Simulation Study 
Simulation results are summarized in two graphs 
given in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Each point inthe 
graphs is the average of 10 simulation runs at 
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different data releasing times introduced by the 
attacker. The data releasing time was changed from 1 
to 10 seconds and the utilization’s of layer 2 and layer 
3 were determined by simulating the system for the 
non-merge and merge switches. The time between the 
arrivals of data packets was assumed to exponential 
with mean 0.08 milliseconds. The processingtimes 
were fixed at 0.01 and 0.04 milliseconds for layer 2 
and layer 3 respectively. It was assumed that the data 
flow was cut through at 5 mnds.Figure2shows 
that as the attacker releasing time increases from 1 
second to 10 seconds, the utilization of layer 2 also 
increases steadily for both types of switching, namely 
non-merge and merge cases. This implies that as the 
attacker increases the releasing time, he will be able to 
make layer 2 more and more busy. On the other hand, 
Figure 3 shows how layer 3 in the non-merge case 
reacts to the release time of the attacker. It is 
interesting that in the merge switch case; layer 3 has 
no effect at all with respect to the release time of the 
attacker. There will not be any oscillation for the same 
flow duration. In non-merging case however, layer 3 
is affected until the release time is equal tothecut 
through time. We can conclude that if the cut through 
time is decreased, the utilization of layer 2 is 
increased and thus more and more data is processed. 
1q I 
Releasing time basis (sec.) 
Figure 2. 
Releasing time basis (sec.) 
Figure 3. 
Another obvious advantage of this scheme is 
apparent in reducing the number of labels and keys. In 
order for a merge switch to be used with 
cryptographic unit, their must exist a mechanism 
between the Crypt Unit and the Merging Unit to - 
enable the Crypt Unit to assign Merent keys to the 
traf€ic when the output buffer is assigned with t r m c  
of Werent destinations. In the case of merge switch, 
the cryptographic unit will use the same key for a new 
flow as the key that was used for the earlier 
established connection, thus reducing key pool size. 
This contrasts with the non-merge switch, where each 
VC has a different key even with VC’s that have the 
same destinations. Besides, the key-agile unit has to 
work fast enough to change keys to keep 
synchronized with cell transmission. 
5. Conclusion 
New technology brings with it unprecedented 
security threats, and IP switching is relativelynew 
technology that its security was investigatedinthis 
paper. We have described and simulated the ‘‘ 
oscillation” attack and suggested to enhance the 
security in IP switching of Ipsilon against sucha 
threat using merging switches. Simulation results on 
merge switches shows how it alleviates the 
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